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Abstract 
This paper explores the drivers of African migration drawing on micro data from comparable 
household surveys of rural households conducted in Ghana, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe 
between 2013 and 2015, including a short longitudinal data set for Ghana, which tracks 
households over time.  We compare characteristics of migrants with non-migrants and 
identify the importance of youth, gender and education as drivers of migration. We reveal a 
complex and gendered pattern of migrant decision-making and an equally complex and 
gendered pattern of remittance sending of diverse items via varied channels.  
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Executive Summary 
This paper provides a comparative analysis of the nature of migration and remittances in 
three African countries, drawing on the Migrating out of Poverty household surveys of 
Ethiopia, Ghana and Zimbabwe. Particular emphasis is placed on the gendered nature of 
migration and remittance patterns. Comparisons are made between migrants and non-
migrants and an econometric model of the household and individual drivers of migration is 
estimated. We also explore some of the associations between migration and poverty. 
We find evidence of two overlapping groups of migrants: an older group of both men and 
women following long-established migration routes, sometimes international, into mining 
and seasonal agriculture, for example, and a younger, slightly better educated group of men 
and women, leaving paid employment in rural areas and responding to new opportunities in 
construction and domestic work. While youth is undoubtedly a prominent feature of 
contemporary and future migration in Africa, it is likely that migration of older generations 
from low-income countries will persist for some time to come. This in turn raises an additional 
dimension to migration policy debates on social protection and employment precarity.  
Our data also challenges ideas that women are less likely to migrate than men. While this is 
the case in two of our countries, it is only partially true in Ethiopia. Our survey there reveals 
that women are more likely to migrate internationally than men. At the time of our survey 
(2015) demand was very high for domestic workers in the Gulf states, and our data suggests 
that women opted to migrate abroad while men moved to work on the numerous 
infrastructure construction projects underway in Ethiopia. Much of this migration of women 
is facilitated by recruitment agents – perhaps a necessary way to secure training, 
employment, visas etc. Remittances from women working in the Gulf states are substantial, 
and the prospect of such high remittances, is perhaps an inducement for even women with 
dependent children at home to migrate.    
Finally, our data also reveals the importance of in-kind remittances and the gendered nature 
of choices relating to what migrants send home. Again, we challenge ideas that women are 
less likely to send remittances home, observing that the dollar value of in-kind remittances 
sent home by women in Zimbabwe all but removes the gap in cash remittances. 
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Introduction 
Migration occupies an uncomfortable position in policy debates. On the one hand, national 
governments often seek to control and restrict immigration, citing, at best, very weak 
evidence on the negative impacts of immigrant workers on wages, employment, access to 
services, security issues and integration concerns. While, on the other hand, most economists 
would argue that the free movement of labour within and across countries is an important 
factor in boosting economic productivity, lowering inequality and reducing poverty, and 
furthermore, that migration is a consequence of rising standards of living.1 
What is often overlooked is that most migration is internal migration of individuals within the 
border of the country they were born in and that much of international migration is within 
the Global South. For example, the World Bank (2016) estimates that there are approx. 247 
million people living outside of their country of birth, which is approximately 3% of the global 
population, and that South-North migration makes up only a third of this.  The UN estimates 
that there are a further 763 million internal migrants living away from their place of birth, but 
within their country of birth. These figures suggests that internal migrants outnumber 
international migrants by over three to one, yet it is international migrants in the North that 
attract the most attention. 
This paper explores the drivers of African migration drawing on micro data from comparable 
household surveys of rural households conducted in Ghana, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe between 
2013 and 2015, including a short longitudinal data set for Ghana, which tracks households 
over time between 2013 and 2015.  We also present comparative evidence on the nature of 
remittance flows and their use by recipient households and explore the role of the private 
sector in facilitating migration.  
The Migrating out of Poverty surveys are described in detail in annex 1 but it is worth flagging 
two points about the surveys here.2 Firstly, our definition of migration follows accepted 
practice3 to identify both a spatial and a temporal dimension. We identify individuals as 
migrants if they have moved away from their community, usually defined as their village, for 
a period of at least three months, and for purposes that may include work, education, and 
family reasons. By using a relatively generous definition of what types of mobilities might be 
counted as migration – a short period, over a short distance and for multiple possible 
purposes - we offer researchers the chance of exploring a greater diversity of migration and 
mobility patterns, including short term seasonal migration to neighbouring districts as well as 
longer term migration to international destinations. We define a migrant as internal if they 
are still within the borders of their country where their origin household is located and 
interviewed and we define them as international if they are located in another country.  
Second, our surveys are of rural households in migrant-sending regions of each country hence 
they cannot be considered nationally representative. However, the sample of migrants is 
randomly selected and relatively large and therefore can provide useful insights into migrant 
decision-making, comparisons between migrants and non-migrants, and a detailed 
exploration of gender differences.  
                                                            
1 See for example Clemens (2014) 
2 All micro-data is available at http://migratingoutofpoverty.dfid.gov.uk/research/migrationdata 
3 See for example Bilsborow (2016). 
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Women and men on the move in Ethiopia, Ghana and Zimbabwe. 
One of the insights from our research in these three countries is that migration is highly 
gender-nuanced and that generalisations about migration are difficult to make without 
unpacking data by gender. We show here some characteristics of migrants from each survey 
as a pre-cursor to discussing drivers of migration.  
Table 1 below shows the size of the samples of migrants collected through the Migrating out 
of Poverty surveys and how these are distributed by gender and by broad destination. Note 
how the gender split varies across countries: in Ghana and Zimbabwe, men make up between 
two-thirds and three-quarters of migrants. Contrast this with Ethiopia where the share of 
women among migrants is almost a half.  Part of this story is that women in Ethiopia are 
actively recruited as domestic workers in the Gulf States, and this is reflected in the relatively 
high proportions of women migrants from these countries who are international migrants 
compared to the case of Zimbabwe. 
 
Table 1: Migrant Destinations by Gender 
 Men Women All 
 % No. % No. % No. 
ETHIOPIA 2014 100 799 100 731 100 1530 
Internal 81.60 652 59.40 434 71.00 1086 
International 18.40 147 40.60 297 29.00 444 
       
ZIMBABWE 2015 100 1095 100 422 100 1517 
Internal 44.10 483 41.20 174 43.30 657 
International 55.90 612 58.80 248 56.70 860 
       
GHANA 2013 100 812 100 450 100 1262 
Internal 93.00 755 96.90 436 94.40 1191 
International1 7.00 57 3.10 14 5.60 71 
       
GHANA 2015 100 538 100 361 100 899 
Internal 91.3 426 96.6 288 93.2 714 
International1 6.8 42 3.4 10 6.8 52 
1 Note that the Ghana surveys were not designed to select households with international 
migrants due to the early focus of this survey on internal or domestic migration. Thus the 
figures on international migrants are highly underestimated and give a mis-leading picture 
about the proportions of migrants who are internal versus international. 
 
Delving in to the detail on destination choices of migrants from each country, we see that 
Ethiopian migration is not only mostly internal but also very local. Around 60% of men internal 
migrants and 70% of women internal migrants remain within the same region of the country. 
The remainder are in another region or in the state capital Addis Ababa4 . The Gulf States are 
                                                            
4 Addis is not a common destination: less than 10% of all migrants are in Addis. 
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the overwhelming destination for international migrants, reflecting opportunities for 
domestic work for women and construction work for men. Within the regions, however, there 
are some interesting differences. Internal migrants from Tigray and Oromia predominantly 
stay within their own region, while those from Amhara and SNNP are more likely to be found 
elsewhere in Ethiopia. This is true for both men and women internal migrants. It is not obvious 
that distress push factors are behind this: both Tigray and SNNP are historically high poverty 
regions but have experienced rapid reductions in poverty since 1996 and there has been a 
convergence in regional poverty rates.5 More plausible is that migration destination is driven 
by work opportunities. Oromia has benefitted in recent years from significant Chinese 
investment in transport infrastructure (including the Addis–Adama expressway) and during 
fieldwork a number of household respondents referred to employment opportunities on 
Chinese road and rail construction projects, including the Addis-Djibouti rail link, which 
crosses parts of Oromia and has a number of stations located in the region. 
Zimbabwe presents a slightly different picture. Historically migration from Zimbabwe to South 
Africa has mostly been confined to people living along the border with South Africa, such as 
Gwanda, with Zimbabweans from Chivi and Hurungwe much more likely to migrate internally, 
either to farms and mines, or urban centres.6 Now, however, over half of all migrants are 
international, rising to 75% in Gwanda, and South Africa is the most significant international 
destination for both men and women from all districts of the country. Even as far from the 
border as Hurungwe, 75% of international migrants are in South Africa. Internal migration is 
however still very important in Zimbabwe, particularly in Hurungwe where 73% of male 
migrants and 60% of women migrants are within Zimbabwe. Internal male migrants from 
Hurungwe and Chivi move outside of their province, while those from Gwanda are just as 
likely to remain within the same province as move away. It is possible that we are observing 
men moving closer to the border in a form of step migration. Women internal migrants on 
the other hand are more likely to remain closer to home: 65% of them stay in the same 
province, although most of these women have moved to another district. It is possible that 
they too are following a step pattern to migration, but making smaller steps, before they 
reach the point for international migration. It is also possible that women are moving within 
their provinces replacing male labour.   
Our data for Ghana can’t be used to explore international migration patterns as the survey 
was designed to only capture internal migrants. However, it can provide insights into internal 
patterns of migration. The largest single destination for all internal migrants is Accra: over 
25% of all internal migrants go to the metropolitan Accra areas as their first destination, with 
a third of all internal migrants going to the Greater Accra region. Migrants from Volta and the 
Northern region are more likely to choose Accra as their first destination (over a third of 
migrants from these regions go to Accra, compared to 7-12% from Upper West and East 
respectively) which may reflect proximity to Accra as opposed to other possible destinations. 
Kumasi is also a popular destination for migrants from the Upper East, Northern and Brong 
Ahafo regions, with other destinations in the Ashanti region also proving popular (for 
example, the Obuasi district in the mining area appears to attract migrants from Upper West). 
                                                            
5 World Bank Group. 2015. Ethiopia Poverty Assessment 2014. Washington, DC. © World Bank. 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/21323 
6 Dzingirai, Mutopo and Landau (2014) 
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Brong Ahafo is also an important destination for poor farmers from the Upper East and Upper 
West.7   
It is possible that these destinations are chosen for the economic opportunities they offer 
potential migrants. Kumasi and Accra are both significant cities.  However, we see across our 
surveys that migrants often migrate along routes laid down by earlier migrants from their 
villages and communities and that the first destination is not always the last but instead 
represents a pause along a longer route. 
Age of migrants and duration of migration episodes 
Generally, the stock of female migrants in our sample is slightly younger than male migrants. 
This does not necessarily mean they migrate at an earlier age than men do, so we also show 
our estimates of their age at the time of migration using information on migration duration. 
Women have generally shorter migration episodes than men, on average between 4 and 9 
months less, hence on average they do migrate at slightly younger ages than men. This may 
reflect gendered opportunities at home and at other destinations: to the extent that women’s 
economic opportunities are constrained to unpaid family labour at home then the 
opportunity of paid employment as a migrant may exert a stronger pull than for men who are 
more likely to have paid employment opportunities at home. Women are also more likely to 
migrate for marriage and family reasons and are likely, on average, to be younger than their 
spouses. Further, there may be some occupations, domestic work, for example, where youth 
is an advantage as younger women may be seen as more docile and malleable (see for 
example, Awumbila et al, 2017 on Ghana). 
 
Table 2: Age of migrants (years) at time of survey and at time of departure and duration of 
migration episodes (months) 
 Men Women 
 
Age at 
survey 
Age at 
departure 
Duration 
of 
migration 
Age at 
survey 
Age at 
departure 
Duration 
of 
migration 
Ethiopia 26.6 23.3 40 23.7 20.7 36 
Zimbabwe 36.6 33.1 42 33.6 30.9 39 
Ghana 2013 32.0 28.3 56 28.7 25.9 55 
Ghana 2015 28.6 27.2 36 26.4 24.5 32 
 
In terms of duration of migration, we ask households to report how long each migrant has 
been away. We see, in Table 2, that durations are generally shorter for women than men, and 
that our migrants have been away from home for between three and four years. As this is of 
a current migration spell, and the migrant has not (yet) returned to the household, these 
should not be interpreted as necessarily meaning that women migrate for shorter periods of 
time. Rather the shorter duration may indicate that migration of women is a relatively recent 
phenomenon.  This quite lengthy average duration of migration suggests a number of 
nuances. First is that our data does not pick up much short term seasonal migration, which is 
plausible given that  because seasonal demand for labour may be for periods shorter than 
                                                            
7 See Awumbila et al, 2015 
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three months Secondly, the table reports mean and there is some variation around this. Even 
so, median durations are still in excess of one and a half to two years in each country, and 
with the exception of Zimbabwe, less than 5% of our migrants had been away for 3-4 months 
at the time of the survey. 8  
In most countries, our sample migrants are married or cohabiting at the time of interview 
(although we do not know, nor can we estimate, if marriage occurred before or after 
migration). However, there are interesting variations. In Ethiopia, for example, the 
overwhelming majority of migrants are single (or too young to be married). Women migrants 
are relatively more likely than men to be divorced, separated or widowed and make up as 
much as 23% of women migrants in Zimbabwe. These figures are supported by the reasons 
migrants move, reported on further below.  
 
Table 3 Marital Status of migrants 
 Men Women All 
Ethiopia 2014 % No. % No. % No. 
Single (incl too young to be married) 68.8 548 61.0 442 65.1 990 
Married /Cohabiting 29.5 235 30.4 220 29.9 455 
Separated/Divorced/Widowed 1.8 14 8.5 62 5.1 76 
       
Zimbabwe 2015       
Single (incl too young to be married) 35.3 376 42.9 177 37.4 553 
Married /Cohabiting 59 628 33.9 140 52 768 
Separated/Divorced/Widowed 5.7 61 23.3 96 10.6 157 
       
Ghana 2013       
Single (incl too young to be married) 43.2 401 41.8 240 42.7 641 
Married /Cohabiting 55.5 515 52.6 302 54.4 817 
Separated/Divorced/Widowed 1.2 12 5.6 32 3 44 
       
Ghana 2015       
Single (incl too young to be married) 50.1 230 49.7 156 49.9 386 
Married /Cohabiting 49.0 225 44.0 138 47.0 363 
Separated/Divorced/Widowed 0.8 4 6.4 20 3.1 24 
       
 
Drivers of Migration  
Our definition of migration is broad in that it includes the possibility of migrating for reasons 
other than work. Nevertheless, we see that in every country the main reason reported for 
migrating is work related. The most common reason given is to seek work, rather than moving 
once a job has been secured at the destination. This is particularly stark in Zimbabwe, where 
                                                            
88 In our Zimbabwe survey, seasonal migration is more apparent as slightly less than 25% of migrants have 
been away for 3-4 months. 
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74% of men and 55% of women cite seeking work as the main reason for leaving. Notably, 
women in Ethiopia are more likely to report having secured a job prior to moving, and, in 
Zimbabwe, returning to a previous job is more prevalent among women migrants. These two 
observations suggest that women may be more risk averse than men in migration decisions, 
preferring to move once a job has been identified rather than take the risk of moving without 
having ensured some measure of economic security. We also see that women are more likely 
than men to report migrating for family reasons, such as marriage or joining a spouse at their 
destination, as their main reason for moving. Study or training features in some countries – 
Ghana and Ethiopia - all have a small proportion of migrants for whom continuing their 
investment in human capital is the main reason for migration.  
 
Table 4. Reasons for migrating (top responses) 
 Men Women All 
 % No. % No. % No. 
Ethiopia 2014       
Job transfer 1.4 11 0.3 2 0.8 13 
Work 43.9 351 39.3 287 41.7 638 
Seek work/better work 44.9 359 36.3 265 40.8 624 
Study/training 7.5 60 7.1 52 7.3 112 
To get married and follow the spouse 1.4 11 13.5 99 7.2 110 
       
Zimbabwe 2015       
Job transfer 4.5 49 2.1 9 3.8 58 
New job 5.8 63 3.8 16 5.2 79 
Seek work/better job 73.9 803 55.4 235 68.7 1038 
Return to previous job 8.7 95 12.5 53 9.8 148 
       
Ghana 2013       
Job transfer/opportunity 17.2 137 13.3 59 15.8 196 
Seek work/better job 62.0 493 46.4 205 56.4 698 
Study/ training 11.9 95 16.1 71 13.4 166 
To get married /family reunification 2.8 22 20.1 89 9.0 111 
       
Ghana 2015       
Job transfer/opportunity 11.16 52 9.8 29 10.6 81 
Seek work/better job 62.9 293 28.0 83 49.0 376 
Study/ training 9.0 42 22.6 67 14.3 109 
To get married /family reunification 8.6 40 29.4 89 16.9 129 
       
       
Notes: column % do not sum to 100 as only most commonly reported reasons are reported here 
 
Although our surveys do ask about whether factors related to climate change and conflict 
were important in the decision to migrate, very few respondents cite these as a reason. In 
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Zimbabwe for example, only one migrant cites declining agricultural yields as a factor, and 
only three refer to weather extremes. Five refer to family or other disputes and two to 
political reasons but these are tiny numbers and not up to any more than a comment. The 
numbers are similarly small for other countries. 
Education and Skills 
Across our three countries, migrants tend to be slightly better educated than non-migrants. 
Restricting our sample to individuals aged 16-60 (so as to exclude children, who are less likely 
to be migrants, than are working age adults) we see that migrants generally have completed 
more stages of education than non-migrants. In Ethiopia, migrants are very unlikely to have 
no education and have a higher probability of having secondary and higher education 
compared to non-migrants. In Zimbabwe, the majority of migrants have completed secondary 
school, and in Ghana where the differences are more subtle we still observe a higher level of 
formal education among migrants.  
 
Table 5 Education of migrants compared to non-migrants (%)  
None Some 
Primar
y 
Complet
ed 
primary 
Some 
secondar
y 
complete
d 
secondary 
higher 
educat
ion 
other 
Ethiopia 2014        
Non migrants 36.25 16.36 24.85 14.06 2.59 1.67 4.23 
Migrants 8.91 12.02 30.93 23.97 6.28 13.30 4.59 
Zimbabwe 
2015 
       
Non migrants 17.78 36.0 33.68 1.63 0.22 10.59 
Migrants 0.69 4.08 19.93 64.36 2.77 8.16 
Ghana 2015        
Non migrants 31.61 14.53 5.72 20.15 14.02 4.59 9.37 
Migrants 24.29 12.29 3.81 23.16 18.22 7.49 10.73 
Note: cells show percentage of migrants and non-migrants at each education attainment 
level. Rows sum to 100%.  The Zimbabwe survey does not distinguish between partial and full 
completion of primary school. 
 
We would expect education to be a driver of migration for a number of reasons. Firstly, it 
suggests an investment in formal skills that are transferable across locations and activities, 
rather than specific to activities common at home, such as agriculture or fishing. Education 
also enables people to identify potential job opportunities, possible housing options, as well 
as the costs of migration and thus to reduce the risks of migration. Education may also be a 
passport into certain activities and anything less than secondary education may prevent 
migrants from employment in higher paid occupations.  
 
 
 
12 
 
Modelling migration decisions 
We turn now to modelling the drivers of migration in each country. Conceptually we have a 
choice between modelling outcomes at the household level or the individual level. Here we 
opt for modelling migration decisions at the individual level, i.e. the probability that an 
individual is a migrant or not. A household level model would imply dropping useful 
information on migrants themselves: their skills, gender etc, while an individual analysis 
allows us to incorporate both household and individual level characteristics. We cluster our 
models at the household level to capture the unobserved correlations across individuals who 
belong to the same household (such as risk taking attitudes). We restrict our sample to 
individuals aged 16-60. Even though there are migrants younger and older than these cut-
offs, we would suggest that their migration decisions are likely to be quite different from 
those of conventional working age.  
We model the likelihood of an individual being a migrant with a probit model as follows 
 
hdhihihd
DHXM  
321
)1Pr(     [3] 
 
Where the outcome variable is binary, equal to 1 if the individual is a migrant and 0 otherwise. 
. 
h
X  is the set of individual characteristics of person i in household h in district d, where H 
are the set of household characteristics and D a set of regional or district controls. Our model 
specifications include age, gender, education of the migration, a set of household 
characteristics.  
We also model, as a follow up to this, the determinants of migration type, i.e. distinguishing 
between internal and international migrants, with a multinomial logit where we have three 
possible outcomes: not being a migrant, being an internal migrant, and for Zimbabwe and 
Ethiopia, being an international migrant.9   
We show summary tables here for each country. The appendix has details of region specific 
regressions within each country. 
 
Table 6 Probit model of likelihood of being a migrant 
Dependent variable: migrant=1, 
non-migrant=0.  
Full model - 
Zimbabwe 2015 
Full model - 
Ethiopia 2014 
Full model - 
Ghana 2015 
 Individual characteristics       
Age of individuals 0.0196*** -0.0191*** -0.0146*** 
Female individual -0.633*** -0.0341 -0.324*** 
Education individual (base group if no 
education)       
Education individual: Completed 
primary 1.670*** 0.688*** -0.230** 
Education individual: Completed 
secondary school onward 2.181*** 1.266*** 0.0453 
Job typology individual: (base 
group=paid employee)         
                                                            
9 The lack of international migrants in the Ghana surveys rule this out. 
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Job typology individual: Self 
employed -1.544*** -0.845*** 0.152 
Job typology individual: 
Unemployed or student -0.112 -0.129 0.365*** 
Household Characteristics    
HH size -0.0370*** -0.370*** -0.0842*** 
Age of the HH head -0.0111*** 0.0225*** 0.000928 
Female HH head 0.261*** 0.0262 -0.00438 
 Education HH head (base=no 
education)       
Education HH head: Completed 
primary -0.280** -0.171*** -0.0518 
Education HH head: Completed 
Secondary school onward -0.488*** -0.349*** -0.0397 
 Job typology HH head (base is 
paid employee)       
Job typology HH head: Self- 
employed 0.692*** 0.093 0.102 
Job typology HH head: 
Unemployed or student 0.0842 0.0963 0.115 
Main source HH income: (base 
group=agriculture and land 
rental)     
Main source HH income: Non-
agricultural job -0.052 -0.236** 0.014 
Main source HH income: 
Government and NGO benefits 0.351*** -0.158* -0.0645 
Main source HH income: 
Remittances 0.290*** 0.272*** 0.486*** 
Main source HH income: Other or 
unknown -0.0434 0.16 0.0852 
Agricultural land ownership -0.00496 -- -0.0922 
Having a child in the HH who is 
less than 15 y.o. -0.182*** 0.264*** -0.741*** 
Regional Controls  YES YES YES 
Constant -1.961*** -0.953*** 0.923*** 
Observations 3,383 4524 3,949 
R squared 0.2327 0.2401 0.1067 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistically significant coefficients at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
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Table 7. Multinomial model or choice between no migration, internal and international migration 
Base group: Not being a migrant Zimbabwe Ethiopia 
Individual characteristics Internal 
migrant 
International 
migrant 
Internal 
migrant 
International 
migrant 
Age of individuals 0.0459*** 0.0291*** -0.0286*** -0.0307*** 
Female individual -0.987*** -1.135*** -0.472*** 0.881*** 
Base group: male individual         
Education individual: Completed primary 14.83*** 2.514*** 1.106*** 1.546*** 
Base group: No education         
Education individual: Completed secondary 
school onward 
15.92*** 3.310*** 2.300*** 2.048*** 
Job typology individual: Self employed -2.589*** -2.711*** -1.180*** -1.937*** 
Base group: paid employee         
Job typology individual: Unemployed or 
student 
0.497** -0.492** 0.278 -0.853*** 
Household characteristics         
HH Size -0.177*** -0.0273 -0.733*** -0.489*** 
Age of the HH head -0.0212*** -0.0192*** 0.0495*** 0.0169*** 
Female HH head 0.422*** 0.501*** 0.15 -0.243* 
Base group: Male HH head         
Education HH head: Completed primary -0.136 -0.662*** -0.2 -0.522*** 
Base group: No education         
Education HH head: Completed Secondary 
school onward 
-0.738** -0.879*** -0.699*** -0.458** 
Job typology HH head: Self- employed 1.230*** 1.157*** -0.203 0.977** 
Base group: paid employee         
Job typology HH head: Unemployed or 
student 
0.00119 0.237 -0.295 1.016*** 
Main source HH income: Gold planning and 
trade 
-0.248 -0.353** -0.254* -0.631** 
Base group: Agriculture and land rental         
Main source HH income: Government and 
NGO benefits 
0.592** 0.386* -0.343 0.214 
Main source HH income: Remittances 0.598*** 0.277* -0.341*** 1.573*** 
Main source HH income: Other or 
unknown 
0.193 -0.382 0.135 -12.35*** 
Agricultural land ownership 0.123 -0.0154 .. .. 
Having a child in the HH who is less than 15 
y.o. 
-0.0211** 0.00433 0.564*** 0.191 
Constant -17.42*** -3.076*** -2.611*** -2.595*** 
Pseudo R2 0.2126 0.2126 0.2444 0.2444 
Observations 3,431 3,431 4,531 4,531 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistically significant coefficients at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
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Discussion of results 
We discuss the results from both exercises together and group the discussion around a small 
number of themes. 
 
Youth  
One of the first observations to make from the results is that migration is not just about youth. 
While it is the case that in both Ethiopia and Ghana, younger people are more likely to 
migrate, we find the opposite for Zimbabwe (see row 1 of Tables 6 and 7). Recall that the 
stock of migrants from Zimbabwe are older on average than those from Ethiopia and Ghana 
(Table 2 above) and the prevalence of seasonal migration is much higher in Zimbabwe than 
in the other countries. We also know that Zimbabwean migrants are very likely to be married 
(table 3). Zimbabwe has a very long history of relatively tightly organised migration to South 
Africa to work in mines and/or agriculture. It is likely the social capital built up through this 
experience (knowledge of where opportunities exist, working conditions, pay), which is also 
evidenced in one of the main reasons for migration (returning to a previous job- Table 4), at 
least partly explains why migration probabilities increase with age in Zimbabwe.  Ethiopia on 
the other hand is relatively recently witnessing a huge demand for both internal and 
international migrant labour which would seem to favour youth, namely, work in the rapidly 
growing construction sector and in domestic work. Below we show how recruitment agencies 
operate in these two sectors, which would suggest that these agents replace or reduce the 
need for experience in migration. Hence, whilst the picture of migrants being young, single 
and risk-taking with long time horizons certainly holds for Ethiopia, it is less accurate of 
contexts such as Zimbabwe where migration patterns are well established.  
 
Gender 
Our data shows that men migrants outnumber women migrants in Zimbabwe and Ghana 
while being roughly equal in Ethiopia. Our modelling supports this broad picture, with women 
being less likely to be migrants than men (see row 2 of Tables 6 and 7). There may be lots of 
explanations of this lower propensity to migrate, from cultural norms about gender roles in 
family reproductive responsibilities, and lower levels of education, to higher levels of risk 
aversion. However, Ethiopia provides the exception and gives some insights into how barriers 
to migration for women might be reduced. Ethiopian women have the same probability of 
being a migrant as men (row 2 of table 2)10 but a much higher probability of becoming 
international migrants than internal migrants. So we observe a skew towards international 
migration for Ethiopian women. Recall that Ethiopia has large numbers of women employed 
in domestic work in the Gulf States, often recruited through agencies that train and place 
young women. The recruitment agencies may serve the function of reducing the perceived 
risks of migration11 particularly when demand for migrant labour is relatively recent and the 
migrant-sending population is therefore uninformed about the destination. Of course, there 
                                                            
10 Women from Oromia actually have a higher propensity to migrate than men (see column 4 in table A4 in 
Annex 2). 
11 A job and accommodation is secured at destination, a salary is known in advance and a contract length is 
fixed. 
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is much written about the exploitative nature of recruitment agencies but the Ethiopian 
context, and elsewhere, suggests that there is a role for the private sector in supporting 
migration.12 
Skills and employment 
Migrants in our samples are relatively better educated than non-migrants in both Zimbabwe 
and Ethiopia (rows 4 and 5 of Tables 6 and 7), and completing secondary education appears 
to be the trigger for migrating, providing the potential migrant with recognised formal 
qualifications and transferable skills. This time Ghana is the exception, but recall from Table 
5 that the distribution of education does not differ much between migrants and non-migrants 
in our sample. This may reflect the different sampling approach (no international migrants) 
but we believe it is picking up the heterogeneity of migrant labour demand in Ghana. 
Individuals with no education are just as likely to migrate as those who have completed 
secondary and there are a wide range of jobs at destination. We show below and in the 
annexes some examples of occupational mobility of migrants, comparing the last held job at 
home with the job at destination. For Ghana, we can see a number of teachers in our sample 
who move into other teaching roles, as well as a large number of farmers who move into a 
range of relatively unskilled occupations at destination.  Occupation is also correlated with 
the likelihood of being a migrant. We see for example in Ghana that the self-employed are 
less likely to be migrants compared to those who are paid employees. A large proportion of 
the latter are paid labourers, including casual workers, and hence more mobile than the self-
employed, which include those who work on their own land as well as traders and craftsmen, 
and therefore probably have more human capital invested in their home location.  
Our modelling also reveals some interesting results about the effects of the education of the 
household head on an individual’s propensity to migrate. We see that the better educated 
the head is, the lower the probability the referenced individual has of being a migrant. The 
reference person in our models is always an individual with no education, so the results 
suggests that having a better educated head reduces the pressure on other members of the 
household to migrate, as the head is likely to be able to earn enough to support less skilled 
members of the family. Having a head with no education is associated with increased pressure 
on other members with no education to migrate.  
 
Family Responsibilities 
Our results suggest that individuals who come from larger households are less likely to 
migrate (see row 7 of each table). This suggest that family responsibilities such as caring for 
the elderly and very young members deter migration. This challenges some of the ideas about 
surplus family labour being a driver of migration. One exception, provided by Ethiopia, is that 
having a dependent child in the household increases the likelihood of a household member 
being an international migrant (see row 19 of table 7).  This last result may reflect the 
relatively high wage opportunities abroad and we see in the discussion of remittances that 
transfers from international migrants from Ethiopia are very high, possibly contributing to the 
costs of child and elder care. Hence, when the prospects of significant remittances are high, 
                                                            
12 See the work of Migrating out of Poverty for analysis which highlights the facilitating role of recruitment 
agents e.g. Abrar et al (2017); Awumbila et al (2017). 
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for example for international migrants from Ethiopia, then migration incidence may be higher 
for those with dependent children. Aspirations for one’s children may therefore be an 
important factor in determining who migrates but also to where they migrate. 
 
 
Poverty of the migrant-sending households 
We see evidence of remittance dependency in all three countries among households who 
have migrants. There is some evidence that, in Zimbabwe, migration is associated with poorer 
family backgrounds, as shown by the positive correlation between dependency on 
government transfers and aid and the likelihood of being a migrant. The finding discussed 
above, that individuals with no education who come from households whose head has no 
education, and therefore likely to be among the poorest, are more likely to migrate than those 
who come from households with a better educated head, is also relevant for understanding 
the role of poverty as a driver of poverty.  
Asset ownership in the form of land does not seem to be associated with migration 
probabilities.   
Migration and socio-economic development in sending countries 
Traditional models of migration such as the Harris-Todaro model of rural to urban migration 
suggest that migration is undertaken to benefit the migrant. The potential migrant compares 
their actual wage (or income) in the rural area with the wage they might expect to earn in the 
urban area. The decision to migrate is based on whether the latter is higher than the former. 
Developments to this model also factor in costs of migration, explore the importance of the 
urban informal sector and consider the time horizon over which this calculation might be 
made, but essentially the assumption remains that migrants must benefit from their 
migration. These models have been criticised extensively and there has been an emergence 
of models in the New Economics of Labour Migration school of thought whereby migration is 
not viewed as a decision purely for the migrants benefit but is part of a decision entered into 
by the broader household to spread risk spatially across sectors and spaces which face risks 
that are not covariant with the sending area.13 The objective of migration is to smooth income 
rather than to maximise income, and remittances are one mechanism through which shocks 
to income at home can be offset.  In this framework, it is possible that households do not 
experience an increase in income or expenditure but rather face a less volatile income stream. 
It is therefore an empirical question about whether migration raises the welfare of the family 
at home.   
In this section, we explore self-reported poverty of households with and without migrants; 
report on modelling of the impact of migration on household consumption undertaken by 
Migrating out of Poverty and examine patterns of remittances.   
 
 
                                                            
13 See for example Lucas and Stark 1985. 
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Poverty and wellbeing  
We explore in this section households’ own self-reported wellbeing along with more objective 
indicators of living standards. Our surveys contain a number of wellbeing questions, mostly 
asking households to compare their current situation with that five years ago. Responses are 
broadly consistent within each survey so we present here the results on a single indicator, 
adequacy of the household’s financial situation.   
The striking feature of the data is that there is no common trend in whether migration per se 
is associated with improvements in household‘s own perception of poverty and much seems 
to depend on whether the migrant is international or internal and whether they send 
remittances. In Ethiopia, households with international migrants stand out as being more 
likely to have experienced improvements in their wellbeing, and we know that many of these 
international migrants are in the Gulf states and remitting large amounts of money to their 
families at home. Ethiopian households with internal migrants appear to be very similar to 
households with no migrants.  In Ghana (2013 and 2015), there is little difference between 
any of the household groups, and in Zimbabwe it is households with internal migrants which 
if anything seem to have fared better. We think this last finding for Zimbabwe may reflect the 
devaluation of the South African Rand, which will have reduced the purchasing power of 
remittance income from migrants in South Africa, and an increase in xenophobia in the period 
leading up to our survey.  
These results are supported by Migrating out of Poverty work modelling the impact of 
migration in Ghana and Ethiopia on household expenditure, which was only collected in our 
later round of surveys.  This is difficult to do using a single cross section of data as we cannot 
observe changes over time so in comparative research we rely a methodology that essentially 
uses expenditure of households without migrants to predict what expenditure of households 
with migrants might have been had the migrant remained at home.14 We estimate in Ghana 
for example that households with migrants are on average very slightly worse off than they 
would have been if they had not migrated, and that households which do benefit from 
migration are those whose migrants had a relatively better planned migration: close contacts 
at the destination, for example. In contrast, households in Ethiopia benefit on average, and 
that gains are associated with remittance receipt, which tend to be higher from international 
migrants. Our fieldwork in Zimbabwe revealed that households with migrants in South Africa 
were very pessimistic about the potential benefits of international migration, as a result of 
the strong devaluation of the Rand and a rise in xenophobic attitudes in South Africa.  
Further work using the longitudinal data from our Ghana surveys, which permits us to build 
an index of housing quality, suggests that successive migration (migration of further 
household members from households already with some experience of migration) has no 
impact on household welfare, at least in the relatively short period of two years between our 
surveys (Egger and Litchfield, 2017). We find that lower costs of migrating for later migrants 
means households are less likely to finance migration though the sale of assets and more 
likely to finance it through savings and remittances from earlier migrants; and that 
remittances of successive migrants are less frequent and lower in value than those form 
earlier migrants.  
                                                            
14 See Awumbila et al 2016, and Abdelmoneim and Litchfield 2016. 
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Our research thus suggests that it is not possible to draw blanket conclusions that migration 
is good for poverty reduction of the sending households and that there are nuances around 
what types of households have migrants and the type of migration they experience. 15 
 
 
Table 8. Subjective well-being compared with five years previously 
 
Households 
with No 
Migrants 
Households 
with Internal 
Migrants 
Households 
with 
International 
Migrants 
Households 
with both 
Internal and 
International 
Migrants Total 
 % No. % No. % No. % No.  % No. 
ETHIOPIA 2014           
Much improved 9.9 40 10.1 46 15.4 35 16.4 20 11.7 141 
Improved 53.7 217 50.2 228 58.6 133 63.9 78 54.3 656 
Neither improved 
nor getting worse 19.3 78 17.8 81 11.0 25 9.8 12 16.2 196 
Worse 16.6 67 20.3 92 14.5 33 9.8 12 16.9 204 
Much worse 0.5 2 1.5 7 0.4 1 0.0 0 0.8 10 
Total 100 404 100 454 100 227 100 122 100 1207 
           
ZIMBABWE 2015           
Much improved 2.7 9 1.8 6 2.9 12 2.9 3 2.5 30 
Improved 21.1 71 33.1 112 26.8 111 30.8 32 27.3 326 
Neither improved 
nor getting worse 24.3 82 26.9 91 23.2 96 23.1 24 24.6 293 
Worse 36.2 122 32.8 111 36.0 149 35.6 37 35.1 419 
Much worse 15.7 53 5.3 18 11.1 46 7.7 8 10.5 125 
Total 100 337 100 338 100 414 100 104 100 1193 
           
GHANA 20131           
More than 
adequate 6.4 26 4.2 38 11.5 7 22.2 6 5.5 77 
Adequate 35.6 145 37.8 338 27.9 17 29.6 8 36.5 508 
Just adequate 26.3 107 28.9 259 32.8 20 25.9 7 28.3 393 
Inadequate 31.7 129 29.1 260 27.9 17 22.2 6 29.6 412 
Total 100 407 100 895 100 61 100 27 100 1390 
           
GHANA 20151           
More than 
adequate 2.2 15 3.4 13 4.5 1 0.0 0 2.6 29 
Adequate 25.3 173 27.2 105 40.9 9 50.0 9 26.7 296 
                                                            
15 Note that this does not mean that migration does not improve welfare of those who migrate. It is highly 
likely that migration does benefit the individual who migrates. The World Bank 2014 poverty profile of Ethiopia 
for example shows that migrants enjoy a much higher consumption level than non-migrants. 
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Just adequate 33.1 226 34.7 134 18.2 4 33.3 6 33.4 370 
Inadequate 39.4 269 34.7 134 36.4 8 16.7 3 37.3 414 
Total 100 683 100 386 100 22 100 18 100 1109 
Subjective well-being here refers to the adequacy of the household’s financial situation compared to 5 years previously. 
1. Note for Ghana that sample of households with international migrants is strongly under-estimated.  
 
 
Migrant Remittances 
One of the main mechanisms that links migration to potential improvements in welfare of 
their families and communities at origin is remittances. Remittances can take many forms – 
cash, in-kind and social – but all potentially enable family members to improve their diets, 
access education and health care, make investments in family and farm businesses and 
improve the quality of their lives.  
Cash remittances are commonly understood to be the flows of money (in physical cash or via 
the banking and finance system) between migrants and their families. In-kind remittances are 
the goods migrants send home, which might range from regular parcels of food and personal 
items to medicine, clothing, consumer durables, business equipment and other large items. 
Social remittances refer to the “ideas, know-how, practices, and skills” which migrants share 
with or impart to their families and communities at home” (Levitt, 2001).  
Most discussion of remittances received by developing countries focuses on estimates of 
financial flows between countries that can be identified as transfers between migrants in a 
destination country and their families in the origin country. The most comprehensive 
estimates of international migrant remittance flows are compiled by the Global Knowledge 
Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) and typically comes from the IMF Balance 
of Payments database supplemented with information from country central banks and 
statistics agencies. These estimates show that remittances are larger than official 
development assistance and also more stable than FDI (World Bank, 2017). 
 
Transaction costs and under-estimating migrant remittance flows 
Although the KNOMAD data is uniquely comprehensive, it does underestimate the volumes 
of remittance flows between migrants and their families. Part of this relates to problems of 
definition and how each country implements the definitions set out in IMF protocols (see 
World Bank (2016) for a full discussion). In addition, remittances are likely to be 
underestimated in official figures due to the diversity of what migrants send home and the 
method of sending they choose.   
Cash remittances are often hidden from official estimates because migrants choose to send 
money home via informal means, probably to avoid paying punitive bank charges (see below 
on cost of sending remittances) – taking it home themselves, sending it via friends and family 
travelling between the migrant and their home, or via transportation drivers or using trust-
based networks of brokers such as the hawala system common in Arab and South Asian 
countries. Goods sent home to families are similarly sent via informal means, avoiding formal 
trade channels and charges. These informal means of remitting are near impossible to 
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estimate without comprehensive, comparable and representative surveys of households and 
their migrants. 
In the Migrating out of Poverty household surveys it is possible to identify a very wide range 
of methods of transfer, from formal banking services and mobile banking to using friends and 
family members to carry money home and even using bus and truck drivers to take money 
home. In Zimbabwe and Ethiopia between 55 and 60% of migrant cash transfers are made via 
a formal financial institution, including via banks, post offices, Western Union branches, 
whereas in Ghana less than 30% are via formal banking methods. This may be because the 
Ghana data is heavily weighted towards internal migrants who rely very heavily on friends 
and family to carry or even collect money for their family at home, or take it home themselves 
when they visit. Migrants from Zimbabwe and Ethiopia also use family and friends (and a 
number of international migrants from Zimbabwe will use bus and truck drivers to send cash 
home) but as more of them are international, and certainly in the case of Ethiopian migrants 
in the Gulf, unlikely to be travelling home very often.  
This spread of ways remittances are sent home and an avoidance of formal banking 
mechanisms when feasible suggests that migrants are seeking to avoid the high transactions 
costs of money transfers. The World Bank16 estimates that remittance-sending costs along many 
African corridors are above 10 percent, due to a combination of low volumes and slow uptake of 
technology in fairly under-developed financial markets. Mobile banking is not commonly used by 
the migrants sampled in the Migrating out of Poverty surveys:  4-5 percent in Zimbabwe and 
Ghana, and less than 1 percent in Ethiopia, despite initiatives such as EcoCash in Zimbabwe 
and recent commitments to increase mobile banking support in Ghana. 
 
In-kind remittances  
There are several reasons why migrants might choose to send some of their remittances in 
the form of goods. In-kind remittances may help receiving households to satisfy their 
consumption of certain items that may be difficult to obtain, particularly in rural areas, 
enabling households to perhaps widen their diet, acquire medicine or educational supplies. 
Certain in-kind remittances such as branded goods or consumer durables may also confer an 
additional social value for both migrant and recipient family. These goods might also be 
traded locally. Furthermore, sending goods, rather than money, may help ensure that that 
the migrant has control over what his or her funds are used for. There is a strong gender 
dimension to remittance sending, with gender norms often influencing who sends what type 
of items to whom within the household.17   
The Word Bank’s African Migration Surveys18 collect data on goods sent home by migrants 
but for fairly big-ticket items, including household appliances (refrigerators, deep freezers, TV, 
HiFi system, Washing Machine, Stove/cooker, Microwave, air-conditioners, furniture, 
DVD/Video players, Mobile phones); business equipment (computers and accessories, sewing 
machines, hair-dressing equipment); tractor and agricultural equipment and transport, such 
                                                            
16 World Bank (2017) 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/992371492706371662/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief27.pdf 
17 See for example Pickbourne (2016) and Teye et al (2017) 
18 The full set of the World Bank’s African Migration and Remittance surveys are available from 
http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/mrs 
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as motorbikes, cars, buses, and trucks.  In contrast, the Migrating out of Poverty household 
surveys collect data on remittances in the form of food, clothing, school supplies, and 
medicine as well as larger items of equipment and consumer durables.   
The surveys suggest that in-kind remittances of these types are important, but particularly 
important for women migrants. Figure 1 below shows data for Kenya using the 2009 African 
Migration Survey for Kenya. It shows that a large proportion of both men and women send 
cash remittances, while fewer migrants send in-kind remittances. Women are less likely than 
men to send cash remittances and send less on average in cash, but the value of goods that 
women send home almost removes the gap. A similar picture exists for Burkina Faso and 
South Africa, and for Zimbabwe using the Migrating out of Poverty survey (Figure 2), although 
not for Nigeria nor Senegal. It seems that in some contexts, women prefer to send goods over 
cash, possibly because this way ensures the goods are used for their intended purpose. 
Focussing on cash remittances only raises the possibility of under-estimating the contribution 
that women migrants make to their household and community economy.  
 
Figure 1: Remittances in cash and in kind by gender of sender (Kenya, 2009; monetary values 
in Kenyan Shillings) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Remittances in cash and in kind by gender of sender (Zimbabwe, 2015; monetary 
values in US dollars) 
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Cash remittances 
Our surveys collect data on cash and in-kind remittances received from each migrant, the 
method of transfer, and the main uses of remittances by the household. We report on cash 
remittances in the table below for comparability between the surveys, as the way we 
collected types of goods sent home varies between surveys.  
We see significant variations across countries in terms of how many migrants send 
remittances: ranging from a low of 39% among men migrants in Ethiopia to a high of 66% of 
men migrants in Ghana. There is no obvious gender pattern: in Ethiopia, women have higher 
remittance rates than men, perhaps reflecting their international opportunities.   
  
Table 9.  Percentage of migrants sending cash remittances home in 12 months prior to 
the survey 
 men women Total Total Migrants 
 % No. % No. % No.  
Ethiopia 38.8 310 43.6 319 41.1 629 1530 
Zimbabwe 51.8 557 44.2 182 49.7 739 1487 
Ghana 2013 66.1 504 50.6 211 60.6 715 1180 
Ghana 2015 37.3 202 20.8 75 30.7 277 902 
 
Our surveys also ask respondents to state the main use of cash remittances received over the 
last year. It is plausible that income received from migrants might appear to be used for a 
particular purpose, such as food, but in practise, frees up the household budget to be used 
for other purposes such as investing in human or physical capital. However, it is also possible 
that households adopt a mental accounting approach to their household financial decisions, 
allocating virtual budgets to specific areas of expenditure.19 While taking household 
responses at face value ignores the fungibility of income there is some evidence from our 
qualitative research (see Teye et al, 2017), that remittances are a distinct source of income 
with decisions over their use sometimes determined by the migrant and their relationship 
with the specific receiver of remittances within the household.  
The existing evidence in the empirical literature which seeks to show at the margin the impact 
of remittances on expenditure across a range of budget items is mixed, although a systematic 
review of studies has suggested that the balance of the evidence is that migrant remittances 
are used for productive purposes (Housen et al, 2013). This is reflected in what can be gleaned 
from the Migrating out of Poverty household surveys. It would appear that in contexts where 
remittance are low in frequency or value, notably Zimbabwe and internal migrants in Ethiopia, 
the primary use of remittances is for everyday consumption – principally food and clothing – 
and particularly when the remittances are from an internal migrant. However, in Ethiopia, 
remittances from international migrants are more likely to be used for farm or family business 
investment and development, compared to households with internal migrants, with 
households reporting a range of uses from purchase of seeds and inputs, farm machinery and 
                                                            
19 This argument draws on the mental accounting ideas, first developed by Richard Thaler (1999) which 
challenges the assumption that money is fungible and suggest that instead individuals divide their income 
“mentally” into specific pots for different purposes.  
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land, and other business equipment. We believe this may be due to a behavioural response 
of households to the value of remittances sent home. Ethiopia is a high remittance receiving 
country and in our data we can see that international migrants from Ethiopia send amounts 
that are much higher than what is sent home by internal migrants, and what is reported in 
Zimbabwe and Ghana. These larger amounts lend themselves to being saved or being 
invested: it is harder to make small deposits in contexts where financial infrastructure is weak 
so small amounts are more likely to be spent as part of regular expenditure without freeing 
up much income for investment. Other than food, education and health are also important 
categories of expenditure funded by remittances, and our surveys also suggest school 
supplies. 
Table 10: Main use of Cash remittances received by households 
 internal international both Total 
Ethiopia % No. % No. % No. % No. 
Everyday consumption 70.8 148 33 58 55 55 53.8 261 
Education and Health  6.7 14 5.1 9 4 4 5.5 27 
Paying off debt 2.9 6 8.5 15 5 5 5.4 26 
Farm/business investment 16.8 35 35.3 62 24 24 24.8 121 
Social and Religious 
occasions 1.9 4 5.1 9 2 2 3.1 15 
Household goods 0.5 1 1.7 3 3 3 1.4 7 
Savings 0 0 8 14 6 6 4.1 20 
others 0.5 1 3.4 6 1 1 1.6 8 
Total 100 209 100 176 100 100 100 485 
         
Zimbabwe         
Everyday consumption 75.9 154 74.3 176 70.4 50 74.3 382 
Education and Health 14.8 30 20.7 49 12.7 9 17.3 89 
Pay off  loans 0.5 1 0 0 0 0 0.2 1 
Farm/Business investment 7.9 16 5 12 16.9 12 7.8 40 
Others 1 2 0 0 0 0 0.4 2 
Total 100 203 100 237 100 71 100 514 
Note that our Ghana surveys do not ask respondents about the use of remittances 
 
Financing migration  
Migration is costly and costs include not just transport, but also visas, official documents, and 
possibly bribes to border agents and recruitment brokers. Our data reveals that migrants raise 
this through gifts from family and friends, savings, loans and selling off assets. 
Debt-financed migration is not very common in our sample, with less than 10% of migrants in 
Ethiopia and Ghana and as few as 2.5% in Zimbabwe taking out a loan or accepting an advance 
from an employer or agent. The majority of migrants use savings to finance migration. A 
significant number of migrants finance migration through savings: almost 65% of Zimbabwean 
migrants used savings (41% in Ethiopia and 58% in Ghana). Family and friends also support 
migrants to meet the costs of migration with around 20% of migrants in each country relying 
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on kinship networks. Selling off assets, or mortgaging land in the case of Ethiopia, is adopted 
by between 8% of migrants in Ghana and Zimbabwe and 20% of migrants in Ethiopia. 
One way of interpreting the ways migrants finance migration is to see it as a form of 
investment in a venture that has risks, but also potentially rewards in the form of higher 
earnings and remittance flows back to the family. The wider support from family and friends 
reflects their stakes in the migration being successful. 
 
Dynamics of migration 
We explore in this section some of the dynamics of migration, specifically occupational 
mobility of migrants and changes in migration status over time. 20  
Our surveys collect data that allows us to explore occupational mobility of migrants, 
comparing the job they did before migration with the one they are doing at the time of the 
survey. There are some important caveats to place around this as we rely on the household 
to tell us about what the occupations of their migrant pre and post migration. Recall is an 
issue which affects our baseline here and we cannot be sure households have accurate 
information from their migrants.  It is likely that households find it harder to recall the 
occupation of their migrants who departed longer ago but we see no correlation between 
absence of information on occupation prior to departure and how long the migrant has been 
away so we suggest this potential source of bias is small. The second caveat is that sample 
sizes are quite small, particularly at the level of some occupations.  
We show an occupational mobility matrix for each of Zimbabwe 2015, Ethiopia 2014 and 
Ghana 2015 which show last occupation prior to departure and current occupation at 
destination. The tables are detailed so are presented in Annex 2 as tables A5, A6 and A7. 
One observation we draw is that migrants in skilled occupations prior to migration typically 
find similarly skilled occupations at destinations. In Zimbabwe, most of the technical and 
professional staff remain in these occupations at the destination; and we observe similar 
patterns for Zimbabweans who were administrative staff, transport operators, skilled 
construction workers prior to migration remaining in these occupations. In Ghana, teachers 
from rural areas typically find work as teachers at destination. The less skilled are to be found 
in a wider range of occupations at destination. Among the less skilled, for example, paid 
labourers in agriculture are to be found across a range of similarly unskilled occupations, such 
as farm labouring, paid labouring in other sectors, services, and domestic work.  
The tables also reveal some differences across the countries. In Ethiopia for example migrants 
are drawn from predominantly agriculture, either working on their own land or as paid 
labourers in agriculture, and move largely into paid labouring in farm or non-farm, likely as 
                                                            
20 We explored whether there is any evidence of migration improving asset accumulation, or on perception of poverty status, 
but any differences between households with and without migrants are statistically insignificant. Given the heavy use of 
savings in financing migration we might have expected to see a lower rate of asset accumulation of households with migrants 
in 2015 but this is not the case. We suspect that the time period is too short to be able to identify any meaningful changes 
in welfare (Egger and Litchfield, 2017).  
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labourers on construction sites. Migrants from the rural areas of Zimbabwe and Ghana appear 
to be more heterogeneous in the occupations they held prior to migration.21  
Finally we can observe that some occupations at destination attract migrants from very 
different backgrounds: domestic workers in Ethiopia and Ghana for example are drawn from 
across a wide range of prior occupations.  
Our longitudinal data in the Ghana surreys allows us to explore some of the changes over 
time. Note that the data covers a short period of time, 2013 and 2015, thus we are likely to 
see only quite small changes. We have already seen above from the descriptive work that 
migrants in the 2015 survey are younger than the earlier stock of migrants and there is a slight 
shift away from being married to being single. We also see some changes in the reasons why 
migrants have left, with men showing a small shift away from work related reasons towards 
getting married, and women towards further study and getting married. In terms of 
destinations, there is very little difference between the two cohorts, suggesting that the 
drivers of migration are not changing over the period of our study.  
What we do observe is substantial changes in migration itself. Around a quarter of the 
households in 2013 which did not have a migrant, have one by 2015, and we also observe 
substantial return, with half of the households which were previously labelled as having 
migrants no longer having any current migrants away.  The pattern of new migration and of 
significant return is broadly similar across the regions of the country. Rising unemployment, 
particularly in Accra, may be driving people home. 
 
Table 11. Changes in household migration status. Ghana 2013-2015 
 2015 
2013 
Households without 
migrants 
Households 
with migrants Total 
Households without 
migrants 343 106 449 
Households with 
migrants 312 351 663 
Total  655 457 1112 
 
The reasons cited for return support the idea that return may be motivated by lack of 
opportunities in the larger towns and cities of the country but also highlight the complexity 
of any migration decision. A large proportion of return migrants refer to family issues, and 
also to illness of themselves or a family member, revealing the responsibilities migrants feel 
towards their families, or to the desire to get married. Not being able to find a job and the 
end of a contract are mentioned in about 15% of cases. 
 
                                                            
21 This may also be linked to the finding that migrants are not necessarily better educated than non-migrants in 
Ghana, discussed above in the section on modelling drivers of migration.  
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Table 12. Reasons for Return Ghana 2015 
 N % 
Family issues incl. marital problems and 
homesickness 
82 32 
Earned enough money 5 2 
Sick family member 21 8 
Contract ended 17 7 
Could not find job 24 9 
To get married 4 2 
Migrant became ill 21 8 
Others 83 32 
Total 257 100 
 
The role of the private sector in migration 
Migration is often viewed as a problem waiting to be addressed by government and all too 
often the role of the private sector in improving outcomes for migrants and their sending 
families is overlooked. We highlight briefly two aspects of the private sector which provide 
potential policy levers; first the recruitment industry, the network of formal and informal 
brokers and agents which assist potential migrants to secure work at destination; and 
remittance costs. 
Migration industry22 
We saw in Table 4 that significant numbers of migrants, particularly women, migrate only 
after a job has been secured at the destination. More than half of the migrants in our 
Ethiopian and Zimbabwean sample drew on advice and information from friends and family 
at both home and destination, as well as formal recruitment agencies acting as brokers, and 
employment offices from specific firms before embarking on their migration. Around 13% of 
these contacts were agents or employment offices and of the migrants who report having 
found a job prior to migration, around 40% did so through a recruitment agent or firm. Some 
migrants even secure finance for their journeys through a loan from recruitment agents.23 
Again, we see some nuances around gender: among our Ethiopian sample of migrants, of 
those who had secured a job at their destination prior to migration, almost 50% of women 
had done so via a recruitment agent or broker, compared to around 6% of men migrants.  
Our Migrating out of Poverty work on domestic workers24 reveals that recruitment agents will 
often train young women in child care, care of elderly, food preparation and housework, 
before placing them with families, and a similar training role of agents emerges in other 
sectors. This suggests that both agents/brokers and firms employing migrants have a 
                                                            
22 See the breadth of work on the migration industry in a number of countries carried out by Migrating out of 
Poverty http://migratingoutofpoverty.dfid.gov.uk/themes/migration-industry 
23 Our Asian partners in Migrating out of Poverty (2010 – 2017, Bangladesh and Singapore) have documented 
the phenomenon of debt-financed migration through brokers for Bangladeshi and Indonesian migrants.  
24 There has been a strong rise in demand for domestic workers in urban areas of Ghana, reflecting in part an 
increase in female labour force participation and intensification of work, and most of this demand is met by 
women from poorer rural areas. (Awumbila et al, 2017).  
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significant role to play in preparing migrants for their work ahead, reducing the uncertainties 
of migration and in improving outcomes for migrants by offering good employment matches. 
There is however also the risk of exploitation (debt-financed migration, deception about the 
nature of work at the destination for example) particularly when recruitment agents are only 
loosely regulated. 
Researchers in Migrating out of Poverty have developed a typology of recruitment agents, 
drawing on work on the domestic worker sector in Ghana. They distinguish between formal 
fully registered recruitment agencies (registered and with a licence to operate); formal 
partially registered agencies (registered, but with no licence to operate); individual informal 
brokers and their sub-agents (neither registered nor have a licence to operate); and networks 
of friends and family (Awumbila et al, 2017: p10). They document the incentives and barriers 
to become more formal (often bureaucratic complexity and delays prevent an agent from 
completing the registration process). Fieldwork in Ghana revealed that while there were 
examples of brokers being exploitative, there were also examples of brokers working in the 
interests of migrants, who saw their role as facilitating people to escape unemployment, to 
negotiate better pay or working conditions: not just economic agents but making a social 
contribution too. This challenges conceptualisations of agents and brokers as exploitative, 
with migrants portrayed as their victims without any agency, as portrayed in the literature, 
and is problematic.  
Where there is a role for policy is firstly in improving registration and regulation of 
recruitment agents and secondly in strengthening efforts to support worker’s organisation, 
such as the Ghana Trades Union Council’s support for Domestic Services Workers Union.  
 
Reducing the costs of sending remittances 
We have already described the patterns of remittances sent home by our migrants. Now we 
describe how they send money home, the extent of their reliance on formal money transfer 
offices and the costs of sending remittances, and opportunities for reducing the costs of 
sending money home. 
In our surveys we see a very wide range of methods of transfer, from formal banking services 
and mobile banking to using friends and family members to carry money home and even using 
bus and truck drivers to take money home. In Zimbabwe and Ethiopia between 55% and 60% 
of migrant cash transfers are made via a formal financial institution, including via banks, post 
offices, and Western Union branches, whereas in Ghana less than 30% are via formal banking 
methods. We argue that this reflects the fact that our Ghana sample are mostly internal 
migrants, and indeed we see that they rely very heavily on friends and family to carry or even 
collect money for their family at home, or take it home themselves when they visit.  
This spread of uses and an avoidance of formal banking mechanisms, when feasible, suggests 
that migrants are seeking to avoid the high transactions costs of money transfers. The World 
Bank25 estimates that remittance-sending costs along many African corridors are above 10 percent, 
due to a combination of low volumes and slow uptake of technology in fairly under-developed 
financial markets. Mobile banking is not commonly used by our sample: 4-5% in Zimbabwe and 
                                                            
25 World Bank (2017) 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/992371492706371662/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief27.pdf 
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Ghana, and less than 1% in Ethiopia, despite initiatives such as EcoCash in Zimbabwe and 
recent commitments to increase mobile banking support in Ghana. 
Increasing the volume of remittances that are sent home via formal banking transfers and 
mobile banking and reducing the costs of these transfers may enable recipients to make more 
measured decisions about how to use remittances It can be no coincidence that Ethiopia, 
where use of formal banking transfers is highest and where transfer amounts are large, also 
sees remittances used for farm and business investments. Hence one area available for 
private sector innovations is in developing technology that facilitates the transfer of funds 
home and improves the ability of recipients to manage them. Essentially, extending coverage 
of networks of money transfer agents and reducing transaction costs would be a first port of 
call for a policy recommendation. 
 
Conclusion 
While the analysis in this paper is confined to data from just three African countries, it does 
yield some insights into the nature and processes of migration on the continent. 
First, we can discern the emergence of two broad groups of migrants, an older generation of 
migrants following traditional migration routes for work in agriculture and mining, and a 
younger, better-educated newer wave of migrants exploring new routes and responding to 
new opportunities in new destinations, such as construction and domestic service, some of 
which is international. As more low-income African countries work through the demographic 
transition and make investments, public and private, in education, we are likely to see both 
an increase in the share and the number of migrants who are young and who possess 
transferable skills, and an increasing gap in education levels between those who stay behind 
in rural areas and those who leave.  
Second, we document the phenomenon of female migration and how women migrants may 
differ in their choices and responses to opportunities compared to those of   men. Ethiopia is 
a useful case-study for this, where we see a roughly equal gender ratio among our sample of 
migrants, and a relatively higher proportion of women migrating to international destinations 
outside the continent, chiefly the Gulf States. This shows that there are contexts where 
migration is not necessarily a mainly male activity: in Ethiopia we see large numbers of women 
migrating to work in domestic service, facilitated by recruitment agents who help women 
navigate the complex bureaucratic processes of visas, secure employment and remove some 
of the risks associated with migration. To what extent this remains a sustainable strategy for 
women, i.e. to remain abroad earning relatively high wages, is difficult to say: the majority of 
these women are single, and it is possible that these opportunities close down to women as 
they get older and get married, either because of preferences for unmarried maids in the Gulf 
or from family pressure at home. 
The ways in which Ethiopian women migrate to the Gulf raises questions about the role of 
recruitment agents in facilitating migration and to what extent they are reducing information 
asymmetries, reducing risks and enabling safe migration or contributing to unsafe migration, 
exploitation and even trafficking. Our research suggests that understanding these networks 
of intermediaries or brokers, which range from formal, registered agencies to private 
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individuals, might provide signals about likely sources of demand for migrant labour as well 
as flagging where private sector regulation might be needed. 
Our research provides insights into the complex manner of sending remittances home and 
highlights the high costs of transferring money and the ways that migrants, even international 
migrants, will seek to avoid paying these transaction charges. We see that many of the 
migrants in our samples send money home in ways other than bank and mobile transfers, 
which we interpret as reflecting the high transactions costs in many African corridors. This is 
of concern because not only do transaction costs lower the value to the recipient family but 
the ways that migrants attempt to avoid transactions charges may expose them to greater 
risk of loss. Furthermore, we argue that there is a risk that when amounts received are small 
(perhaps because migrants avoid transaction costs by trickling small amounts home via 
travelling friends and family),  it may be harder for recipient households to accumulate these 
small amounts to spend on productive assets.  Our Ethiopian data provides support for this 
idea: households with international migrants, who are on average sending much larger 
amounts than internal migrants, are more likely to report using these remittances for making 
farm or business investments.  If remittances are to be encouraged and if they are to have 
greater impact on investment, then reducing transaction costs is key.  
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Annex 1. The Migrating out of Poverty survey approach 
The Migrating out of Poverty household surveys are purposefully designed for rural 
households in developing countries to provide researchers and policy makers with insights 
into a range of migration behaviour and patterns in developing countries. The surveys were 
designed to incorporate larger sub-samples of households with current migrants than are 
typically available in existing surveys, and use a comparable and rich questionnaire designed 
to capture the complexity of migration patterns and behaviour, and to adopt a common 
definition of migration that captures a wide range of migration patterns. This comparability 
in our approach gives us the opportunity to explore the diversity of migration patterns, both 
internal (within a person’s home country) and international (beyond the borders of their 
home country, including to neighbouring countries, other African countries and other 
international destinations), the reliance of households on migration to generate incomes and 
support livelihoods, and the depth of relationships between migrants and their families at 
home.  
Migrating out of Poverty began conducting household surveys in 2013 with surveys in 
Bangladesh, Ghana, and Indonesia, followed in 2014 with a survey in Ethiopia and one in 2015 
in Zimbabwe. All five surveys are available on the Migrating out of Poverty website and can 
be downloaded for free.26 Each dataset is accompanied with a user guide which explains the 
specific approach adopted in each country. In 2015 we revisited the households in the 2013 
Ghana survey, re-interviewed them on their migration experience, added a consumption 
module to the questionnaire and tracked a small sample of migrants to Accra. 
Each survey consists of a sample of approximately rural 1200-1400 households, with 
deliberate over-sampling of households with current migrants. For example, in Ghana, 
nationally representative random sampling of households would have yielded an expected 
sub-sample of just 100 households with current migrants (see Mahé and Naudé, 2016). 
Instead, our approach gave us a sub-sample of over 1000 households with migrants and a 
control group of 300 households with no current migrants.  The sample coverage in each 
country was restricted to regions within each country that have a history of migration, as 
evidenced by previous sample or census data, and informed by the local knowledge of our 
partner institutions.27 All the areas sampled are rural but contain a mix of areas in terms of 
proximity to significant towns and differences in agro-ecology.  
Our strategy to over-sample households with migrants does create one drawback of our 
approach in that our surveys cannot be used to estimate nationally or regionally 
representative estimates of stocks or flows of migrants, the flow of remittances between 
migrants and their households or national or regional level impacts of migration. The 
advantages however are that we have sizeable sub-samples of households with migrants. 
These larger sub-samples of households with current migrants, as well as a group of 
households without migrants, can be used to provide more robust analyses of migration 
                                                            
26 All of our data is publicly available in SPSS and STATA format and can be downloaded from the Migrating out 
of Poverty website, along with questionnaires and related working papers 
http://migratingoutofpoverty.dfid.gov.uk/research/migrationdata. 
 
27 The exception to this is our data for Indonesia, which for reasons of physical accessibility is restricted to just 
one region of the country. 
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processes and impacts at the household level, and a more nuanced understanding of 
migration patterns by gender, age and other important characteristics.   
The core household questionnaire contains modules on household composition and 
demographics, migration experiences of current and return migrants, remittance behaviour, 
household assets, subjective well-being, and income sources. The core questionnaire was 
extended in 2014 to include a consumption module and incorporated into the Ethiopia and 
Zimbabwe surveys. Some of the modules are similar to those one might see in other surveys 
such as the Living Standards Measurement Surveys, but where we innovate is in capturing 
more depth on the migration decision-making process, on remittance behaviour and on 
perceptions of the effects of migration. For example, our surveys ask respondents about who 
was involved in the decision to migrate and the involvement of migration brokers, reasons for 
migration, prior contacts at the destination and financing of migration, methods of sending 
remittances, frequency and amounts of monetary transfers and types of non-cash 
remittances.  We are also able to explore the ways migration is perceived by the sending 
households and its impact on men and women’s work at home.  
We adopt a broad approach to conceptualising poverty, drawing on both subjective and 
objective indicators of poverty, well-being and welfare. Households are asked to list their 
main sources of income and to indicate approximately how much they receive from each 
source. We also record a number of key indicators on their living conditions, such as access 
to safe water and electricity and the materials used to construct their home. Land ownership 
of different types is also captured. We ask household respondents to record their own 
perception of their poverty situation, asking them to make comparisons over time as well as 
relative to other people in their community. The surveys for Ethiopia and Zimbabwe also 
include more detailed questions on household expenditures, recording expenditure on food 
over a 7-day recall period and on larger items over a monthly or annual period. This breadth 
of indicators gives researchers the opportunity to use the data to explore different 
dimensions of poverty and well-being.  
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Table 1 below shows our sample size in each country, disaggregated by type of migrant and where relevant by region. 
 
Table 1 Sample size across regions and by type of household 
 
Households 
with no 
migrants 
Households 
with internal 
migrants 
Households 
with 
International 
Migrants  
Households 
with both 
Internal and 
International 
Migrants Total 
 % No. % No. % No.   % No. 
ETHIOPIA 2014 100 404 100 454 100 227 100 122 100 1207 
Region           
Tigray 24.8 100 17.2 78 37.4 85 30.3 37 24.9 300 
Amhara 24.8 100 32.2 146 13.2 30 21.3 26 25 302 
Oromia 25.7 104 26 118 22.5 51 25.4 31 25.2 304 
SNNP 24.8 100 24.7 112 26.9 61 23 28 24.9 301 
           
ZIMBABWE 2015 100 338 100 338 100 415 100 104 100 1195 
District           
Chivi 29.3 99 24.9 84 45.8 190 26 27 33.5 400 
Hurungwe 29.3 99 59.8 202 17.8 74 23.1 24 33.4 399 
Gwanda 41.4 140 15.4 52 36.4 151 51 53 33.1 396 
           
GHANA 20131 100 427 100 900 100 62 100 29 100 1418 
Region           
Brong Ahafo 16.2 69 16.1 145 72.6 45 41.4 12 19.1 271 
Northern 22 94 23.2 209 3.2 2 0 0 21.5 305 
Upper East 16.4 70 15.9 143 1.6 1 10.3 3 15.3 217 
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Upper West 13.3 57 13.6 122 1.6 1 0 0 12.7 180 
Volta 32.1 137 31.2 281 21 13 48.3 14 31.4 445 
           
GHANA 2015 100 692 100 388 100 22 100 18 100 1120 
Region           
Brong Ahafo 13.9 96 19.1 74 63.6 14 61.1 11 17.4 195 
Northern 26.3 182 19.3 75 4.5 1 5.6 1 23.1 259 
Upper East 14.7 102 22.2 86 4.5 1 22.2 4 17.2 193 
Upper West 14.3 99 17.8 69 4.5 1 0.0 0 15.1 169 
Volta 30.8 213 21.6 84 22.7 5 11.1 2 27.1 304 
1 In Ghana sampling was proportional to population in each region so sample sizes vary across the regions.  
 
Note that the Ghana surveys capture very few international migrants. This is because at that stage of our research we were only focussing on 
internal migration and thus the surveys were designed to only capture households with internal migrants. By chance, some households reported 
that some of their members were international migrants. Our next survey planned for 2018 will add to the existing sample a group of households 
with international migrants. Also, the 2015 re-survey of households did not have a strategy to replace households which moved or dropped out 
of the sample for other reasons, which the 2018 survey has.   
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Annex 2. Country specific and region specific regression results. 
 
Tables in this section provide the regional level estimates of the whole country results presented in Table 6. They show the results of a probit 
model of the determinants of individual i being a migrant.  
 
Zimbabwe 2015 
 
Table A2 Probit model, with clustered standard errors  
Dependent variable: 
Probability of being a migrant  Full model Chivi Hurungwe Gwanda 
HH size -0.0370*** -0.0631*** -0.0748*** 0.00258 
Age of the HH head -0.0111*** -0.00928* -0.0113** -0.0144*** 
Female HH head 0.261*** 0.0701 0.262** 0.255*** 
Base group: Male HH head         
Education HH head: 
Completed primary -0.280** -0.0665 -0.285 -0.381** 
Base group: No education         
Education HH head: 
Completed Secondary school 
onward -0.488*** -0.263 -0.669*** -0.627*** 
Job typology HH head: Self- 
employed 0.692*** 0.927*** 0.865** 0.375** 
Base group: paid employee         
Job typology HH head: 
Unemployed or student 0.0842 0.0753 -0.0156 0.0993 
Age of individuals 0.0196*** 0.0353*** 0.0373*** -0.00173 
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Female individual -0.633*** -0.871*** -0.655*** -0.323*** 
Base group: male individual         
Education individual: 
Completed primary 1.670*** 1.053*** -0.889*** -0.357*** 
Base group: No education         
Education individual: 
Completed secondary school 
onward 2.181*** 1.765*** - - 
Job typology individual: Self 
employed -1.544*** -1.648*** -2.199*** -0.960*** 
Base group: paid employee         
Job typology individual: 
Unemployed or student -0.112 0.0457 -0.169 -0.269* 
Main source HH income: Gold 
planning and trade -0.052 -0.129 0.0429 -0.0367 
Base group: Agriculture and land rental         
Main source HH income: 
Government and NGO 
benefits 0.351*** 0.0702 0.531** 0.321** 
Main source HH income: 
Remittances 0.290*** 0.275** 0.394*** 0.210* 
Main source HH income: 
Other or unknown -0.0434 0.117 0.074 -0.241* 
Agricultural land ownership -0.00496 0.124 -0.144 -0.198 
Having a child in the HH who is 
less than 15 y.o. -0.182*** -0.175* -0.0494 -0.319*** 
District control: Hurungwe -0.0457 - - - 
Base grop: Chivi         
District control: Gwanda 0.273*** - - - 
Constant -1.961*** -2.201*** 0.124 1.443*** 
Observations 3,383 1,116 1,081 1,140 
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Ethiopia 2014 
Table A3 Probit: Individual probability of migrating 
 Full sample Tigray Amhara Oromiya SNNP 
HH SIZE -0.370*** -0.449*** -0.376*** -0.274*** -0.465*** 
Age HH head 0.0225*** 0.0179*** 0.0223*** 0.0103** 0.0373*** 
Gender HH head: Female  0.0262 -0.0505 -0.0865 0.0938 0.176* 
Base group: Male           
Education HH head: 
Completed primary education -0.171*** -0.197* -0.215** -0.0452 -0.143 
Base group: None           
Education HH head: 
Completed Secondary and 
onward -0.349*** -0.269** -0.265** -0.679*** -0.212 
Job category HH head: Self-
employed 0.093 0.0824 -0.0985 -0.0896 -0.076 
Base group: Paid employee           
Job category HH head: 
Unemployed or student 0.0963   -0.035 0.0953 -0.197 
Age of all individuals -0.0191*** -0.0117** -0.0284*** -0.0008 -0.0285*** 
Female individuals -0.0341 -0.434*** 0.0198 0.400*** -0.138 
Education individuals: 
Completed primary education 0.688*** 0.506*** 0.492*** 0.991*** 0.863*** 
Base group: None           
Education HH individuals: 
Completed Secondary and 
onward 1.266*** 1.004*** 1.032*** 2.107*** 1.076*** 
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Job category individuals: Self-
employed -0.845*** -1.793*** -0.601* -0.336 -0.763 
Base group: Paid employee           
Job category individuals: 
Unemployed or student -0.129 -0.918*** 0.0834 -0.151 0.112 
Main source of HH income: 
Non-agricultural jobs -0.236** -0.176 0.0594 -0.643*** -0.512*** 
Base group: Agriculture and land rental           
Main source of HH income: 
Government and NGO 
benefits -0.158* -0.189* -0.0991 0.0811 -0.202 
Main source of HH income: 
Remittances 0.272*** 0.369*** 0.290*** 0.370*** 0.172** 
Main source of HH income: 
Other or unknown 0.16 0.113 -0.061 0.701*** -0.121 
Having a child of less than 15 
y.o. In the HH 0.264*** 0.234** 0.175* 0.292** 0.422*** 
Region control: Amhara -0.0383         
Base group: Tigray           
Region control: Oromiya -0.0176         
Region control: SNNP 0.163***         
Constant -0.953*** 0.557 -0.43 -2.123*** -1.330* 
Observations 4,524 1,032 1,092 1,209 1,180 
 
 
Ghana 2015 
Table A4 Probit: Individual probability of migrating 
 
Full 
sample Brong Ahafo Northern Upper east Upper west Volta 
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HH SIZE 
-
0.0842*** -0.108*** -0.0700*** -0.0672*** -0.113*** 
-
0.0703*** 
Age HH head 0.000928 0.00654 -0.00269 -0.00029 0.000896 0.0044 
Gender HH head: Female  -0.00438 -0.184 0.0573 0.0378 0.204 0.0952 
Base group: Male             
Education HH head: 
Completed primary 
education -0.0518 -0.346** 0.176 -0.248 0.117 0.0453 
Base group: None             
Education HH head: 
Completed Secondary 
and onward -0.0397 -0.403 0.228 -0.324 -0.0873 0.195 
Job category HH head: 
Self-employed 0.102 -0.0524 -0.213 -0.0804 0.0891 0.251 
Base group: Paid employee             
Job category HH head: 
Unemployed or student 0.115 0.18 0.0594 -0.112 0.384 -0.185 
Age of individuals 
-
0.0146*** -0.0298*** -0.0132** -0.000834 -0.0169** -0.0154* 
Female individual -0.324*** -0.274** -0.289** -0.566*** -0.646*** -0.0544 
Base group: male             
Education individual: 
Completed primary 
education -0.230** 0.056 -0.441** -0.0848 -0.327 0.0523 
Base group: None             
Education HH individuals: 
Completed Secondary 
and onward 0.0453 0.218 -0.129 -0.0298 0.228 0.31 
Job category individuals: 
Self-employed 0.152 0.187 0.603 0.0132 0.257 0.257 
Base group: Paid employee             
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Job category individuals: 
Unemployed or student 0.365*** 0.0668 1.100** 0.321 -0.116 0.747** 
Main source of HH 
income: Non-agricultural 
jobs 0.014 -0.0865 0.0798 0.0108 0.345 -0.143 
Base group: Agriculture and land 
rental             
Main source of HH 
income: Government and 
NGO benefits -0.0645     0.28 0.389   
Main source of HH 
income: Remittances 0.486*** 0.564*** 0.494*** 0.525*** 0.456 0.807*** 
Main source of HH 
income: Other or 
unknown 0.0852 0.126   -0.208 0.368 0.404* 
Land ownership -0.0922 0.0341 -0.0832 -0.114 0.11 -0.427*** 
Having a child of less than 
15 y.o. In the HH -0.741***     -0.109 -0.744** -0.406 
Region control: Northern -0.551***           
Base group: Brong Ahafo             
Region control: Upper 
East -0.226**           
Region control: Upper 
west -0.320***           
Region control: Volta -0.157*           
Constant 0.923*** 0.821 -1.016 -0.0367 0.287 -0.244 
Observations 3,949 688 1,172 625 619 752 
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Table A5 Zimbabwe 2015: Occupation mobility  
 Migrant occupation at destination 
Migrant occupation before migrating        
Technicia
n and 
professio
nals 
Mana
ger 
Administra
tive staff 
Sales 
work
er ( 
Servi
ce 
work
er  
Ow
n 
far
m 
Paid 
Labourer 
(agricultu
re) 
Transporta
tion 
operators 
Skilled 
construct
ion 
worker 
Paid 
labour
er 
(non-
farm) 
Producti
on staff  
Own 
busine
ss 
(non-
farm) 
Domes
tic 
worker 
Othe
rs 
Tot
al 
Technician and professionals 29 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 34 
Manager 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 4 
Administrative staff 1 0 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 
Sales worker (e.g. sales/waitress) 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 1 3 1 0 1 3 0 14 
Service worker ( e.g. cleaner, security guard, 
hotel worker) 
2 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 12 
Own farm 3 0 0 4 1 0 1 2 7 2 3 2 2 0 27 
Paid Labourer (agriculture) 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 0 3 6 1 2 2 0 20 
Transportation operators ( e.g. Drivers) 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 1 0 10 
Skilled construction worker 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 9 
Paid labourer (non-farm) 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 2 10 2 0 4 0 21 
Production staff (textile/electronics/others) 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 5 
Own business (non-farm) 1 0 0 1 2 0 2 0 2 3 0 3 0 0 14 
Domestic worker 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 0 8 
Other (specify) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Total 38 0 6 15 16 0 9 12 29 27 8 9 17 1 187 
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Table A6 Ethiopia 2014: Occupational Mobility 
 
Migrant occupation at destination 
Migrant occupation before 
migration 
Technici
an and 
professi
onals 
Mana
ger 
Administr
ative staff 
Sales 
worker 
(e.g. 
sales/wait
ress) 
Servi
ce 
work
er ( 
e.g. 
clean
er, 
secur
ity 
guar
d, 
hotel 
work
er) 
O
wn 
far
m 
Paid 
Laboure
r 
(agricult
ure) 
Transport
ation 
operators 
( e.g. 
Drivers) 
Skilled 
construc
tion 
worker 
Paid 
labou
rer 
(non-
farm) 
Production staff 
(textile/electronic
s/others) 
Own 
busin
ess 
(non-
farm) 
Dome
stic 
worke
r 
Oth
ers 
Tot
al 
Technician and professionals 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Manager 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Administrative staff 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Sales worker (e.g. sales/waitress) 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Service worker ( e.g. cleaner, security 
guard, hotel worker) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 
Own farm 0 0 1 1 0 1 8 1 1 8 0 3 0 1 25 
Paid Labourer (agriculture) 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 0 3 5 0 16 
Transportation operators ( e.g. Drivers) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Skilled construction worker 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Paid labourer (non-farm) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 9 0 4 8 0 23 
Production staff 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Own business (non-farm) 1 0 2 2 0 0 7 0 2 5 1 10 13 0 43 
Domestic worker 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 6 
Other (specify) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 
Total 11 0 3 3 0 2 21 3 4 24 1 21 36 2 
13
1 
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Table A7 Ghana 2015: Occupation mobility  
 Migrant occupation at destination  
Migrant 
occupation 
before 
migrating        
Farmi
ng 
Chains
aw  
Fishi
ng 
Minin
g & 
quarryi
ng 
Maso
nry 
Drivi
ng 
Carpen
try 
Teachi
ng 
Manufactu
ring 
Cleani
ng 
Electric
ian 
Plumbi
ng 
Tradi
ng 
Self 
employ
ed 
Other
s 
Total 
Farming 53 0 1 3 7 8 1 1 0 1 0 1 9 5 20 110 
Chainsaw  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Fishing 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 2 8 
Mining & 
quarrying 
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 
Masonry 1 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 10 
Driving 0 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 11 
Carpentry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Teaching 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 17 
Manufactu
ring 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Cleaning 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Electrician 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 1 6 
Plumbing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
Trading 3 1 0 1 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 16 3 7 36 
Self 
employed 
2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 5 4 16 
Others 0 0 0 2 4 3 0 4 0 0 0 0 3 3 39 58 
Total 59 1 2 12 21 14 2 20 3 1 2 2 38 19 86 282 
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